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The notion of a living constitution-especially when coupled 
with developmental or evolutionary notions-is one of our central 
metaphors, not to say cliches. It is hard to find anyone who is truly 
willing to reject it, given that the alternative seems to be a dead 
Constitution, an option which, so far as I know, has no explicit sup-
porters. Still, as then Justice Rehnquist once said, "the phrase 'liv-
ing Constitution' has about it a teasing imprecision that makes it a 
coat of many colors,"! not all of them, it may be presumed, equally 
pleasing to the eye (or the analytical temperament). 
However, even the Chief Justice, whom some of us would iden-
tify with a rather deadly conception of constitutional interpretation, 
was happy (or at least willing) to quote Justice Holmes's famous 
comment from Missouri v. Holland about the framers of the Consti-
tution having performed "a constituent act," "call[ing] into life a 
being the development of which could not have been foreseen com-
pletely by the most gifted of its begetters. "2 The "organism" that 
was "created" in Philadelphia thus took on a life of its own. Like 
most children it could (and did) grow up in ways that might well 
surprise its parents. Not for Holmes is a sterile form of "original-
ism" that would limit constitutional meaning to the first-order "in-
tentions" of the framers, their specific hopes and dreams as to how 
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their progeny might develop. Instead there is a due recognition of 
those later developments that in tum require more expansive and 
generous interpretation of the Fathers' handiwork than would have 
been thought likely (or possibly even tolerated) at the time of gesta-
tion. Interestingly enough, as the reference to Rehnquist suggests, 
it is hard to find someone who does reject this version of the Holme-
sian insight. Raoul Berger probably does, but Robert Bork, for ex-
ample, certainly does not, as witnessed by his insistent, and 
presumably heartfelt, argument before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee that Brown v. Board of Education was perfectly consistent 
with his "jurisprudence of original understanding. "3 
What the Chief Justice-as well as Bork and former Attorney 
General Edwin Meese, the primary popularizer of the "jurispru-
dence of original intent"4-object to is not the fact of organic devel-
opment as such, including the surprises sometimes presented by the 
fragile child who turns out to be a strapping mountain-climber. 
Rather, what they oppose is the de facto creation-or substitu-
tion-of a new organism on the basis that the earlier one turns out 
to have defective genes. Similarly, even one willing to use develop-
mental metaphors might nonetheless profess to be able to distin-
guish between, on the one hand, development that, however 
unexpected (and thus unforeseen), can be shown to have been gen-
3. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Part I, lOOth Cong., lst 
Sess. 284-86 ( 1989). 
[P]assing that historical evidence, which I think casts some doubt on the fiat as-
sumption that the 14th amendment really meant separate but equal, let me say this. 
They wrote a clause that does not say anything about separation. They wrote a 
clause that says 'equal protection of the laws.' 
I think it may well be true ... that they had an assumption which they did not 
enact, but they had an assumption that equality could be achieved with separation. 
Over the years it became clear that that assumption would not be borne out in 
reality ever. Separation would never produce equality. I think when the back-
ground assumption proved false, it was entirely proper for the court to say 'we will 
carry out the rule they wrote" and if they would have been a little surprised that it 
worked out this way, that is too bad. That is the rule they wrote and they assumed 
something that is not true. 
. . . You could suppose they had written a clause that said 'we want equality 
and that can be achieved by separation and we want that too.' 
By 1954 it was perfectly apparent that you could not have both equality and 
separation. Now the court has to violate one aspect or the other of that clause, as I 
have framed it hypothetically. It seems to me that the way the actual amendment 
was written, it was natural to choose the equality segment, and the court did so. I 
think it was proper constitutional law, and I think we are all better off for it. 
ld. at 286. 
4. See Edwin Meese III, "Address before the D.C. Chapter of the Federalist Society 
Lawyers Division," reprinted in Sanford Levinson and Steven Mailloux, eds., Interpreting 
Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader 25, 30 (Northwestern U. Press, 1988). Meese 
also proclaimed his support for Brown. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 
Tul. L. Rev. 979, 983 (1987). 
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erated in substantial part by the organism's internal structure and, 
on the other, outright mutation generated by exogenous causes. 
Thus I arrive at the central topic of this article, which is to 
unpack some of the various meanings packed within the term 
"amendment." Americans, at least, confront the notion of amend-
ment in the context of our commitment to a legal order presump-
tively structured by reference to some set of basic norms that are 
independent of the ordinary political process. These norms are at 
once the pride and bane of (a distinctively American) political the-
ory.s They are our pride insofar as they stand for the protection of 
the rights of unpopular minorities against the desire of legislative 
majorities to restrict them; they are our bane insofar as they serve 
by definition to restrict popular democracy, itself a basic norm of 
our system. At the very least, it is often argued, popular sover-
eignty should be honored in the absence of constitutional limita-
tions. What these limitations are is, of course, the central issue of 
American constitutional theory. 
I 
Acquaintance with the ordinary operations of our legal system 
makes us aware of the crucial contrast ordinarily offered between 
ordinary development by "interpretation" and extraordinary devel-
opment by "amendment." The former is, almost by definition, un-
exceptional; the latter signifies something out of the ordinary, 
something truly new. Thus the Supreme Court, through Felix 
Frankfurter, has insisted that "[n]othing new can be put into the 
Constitution except through the amendatory process. Nothing old 
can be taken out without with same process."6 "New," in this con-
text, is clearly a term of art, since presumably no one would deny 
that law could change and in that sense be "new": different at time 
T, from what it was at time T. The contrast between interpretation 
and amendment is akin to that between organic development and 
the invention of entirely new solutions to old problems. From this 
5. I agree with Bruce Ackerman both that American thought is distinctive in its con-
ceptualization of law and that we are tempted to forget its distinctiveness and try to fold it 
into the two central traditions bequeathed us by European thought, a focus on natural justice, 
on the one hand, or simple acquiescence to parliamentary sovereignty, on the other. See 
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale L.J. 453, 455-56, 461-
86 (1989). Ackerman elaborates his argument in We the People (Harvard University Press, 
1991). 
6. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956). I owe my awareness of this 
quotation to Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment: A Study of Logic, Law, Omnipo-
tence and Change 163 (Peter Lang Pub., 1990). Suber's book came to my attention only after 
the preparation of this article, though it is clearly relevant to many of the themes I want to 
address. 
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perspective "interpretations" are linked in specifiable ways to analy-
ses of the text or at least to the body of materials conventionally 
regarded as within the ambit of the committed constitutionalist. 1 
"Amendments" are something else. 
Perhaps the simplest way of conceptualizing what we mean by 
an amendment is to describe it as a legal invention not derivable 
from the existing body of accepted legal materials. Consider in this 
context James Madison's plaintive argument to the First Congress, 
while attacking the legitimacy of chartering the first Bank of the 
United States, that the Constitution must be interpreted within an 
ideological framework that accepts as "[t]he essential characteristic 
of the Government" its composition only from "limited and enu-
merated powers." By way of exemplifying his view that "no power, 
therefore, not enumerated could be inferred from the general nature 
of Government," he stated that "[h]ad the power of making treaties 
... been omitted, however necessary it might have been, the defect 
could only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the 
Constitution. "s 
Assuming that one needs additional proof of the sincerity of 
Madison's strong distinction between what can legitimately be in-
ferred from the Constitution and what would require amendment 
for its realization, it is surely provided by his 1817 veto of a bill 
providing for internal impovements. Though acknowledging "the 
great importance of roads and canals" and the "signal advantage to 
the general prosperity" of their improvement, he nonetheless saw it 
as beyond the enumerated powers even while "cherishing the hope 
that its beneficial objects may be attained by a resort for the neces-
sary powers" to the procedures "providently marked out in the in-
strument itself [as] a safe and practicable mode of improving it as 
experience might suggest. "9 Madison thus had no objection in prin-
ciple to federally financed internal improvments; he simply believed 
that Congress was without power to call them into being until what 
Bruce Ackerman would identify as "we the people" fabricated new 
powers for the national government and signified that fabrication 
through formal amendment. And such notions are not found in the 
United States alone. Thus German Chancellor Kohl justified the 
refusal of Germany to send troops to the Persian Gulf on the 
7. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (Oxford U. Press, 1982) for an elucidation of 
six "modalities" of constitutional interpretation, all of which are joined as "interpretations." 
8. Madison's speech to the House of Representatives is reprinted in Paul Brest & San-
ford Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking 11 (Little, Brown, 2d ed., 1983). 
The quoted passages can be found at 12, 13. 
9. Richard B. Morris & Jeffrey B. Morris, eds., Great Presidential Decisions 81 (Rich-
ardson, Steirrnan & Black, Inc., 1988). 
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grounds that the German constitution prevents the deployment of 
German troops outside the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Yet we are told that the Chancellor wishes "to over-
come" this constitutional hurdle, and "Mr. Kohl advocates a con-
stitutional amendment specifically allowing German troops to join 
international alliances." w 
In many contexts, therefore, to describe something as an 
amendment is thus at the same time to proclaim its status as a legal 
invention and its illegitimacy as an interpretation of the pre-existing 
legal materials. To designate something as an interpretation, even if 
one is ultimately not persuaded by it, is to accord it a certain legal 
dignity that is absent if one rejects the very possibility of its having 
been offered as a "good faith" exercise in interpretation. The latter 
will probably be described as an attempt to "amend" the Constitu-
tion surreptitiously, in violation of the approved procedures by 
which inventions are accepted into the constitutional fabric. II This 
may be what Madison meant to suggest when he stated that "it was 
not possible to discover in [the Constitution] the power to incorpo-
rate a Bank,"I2 though perhaps he meant simply that it was indeed 
"possible" -Alexander Hamilton showed exactly how one could do 
it-but ultimately unpersuasive. A pervasive problem in analyzing 
legal rhetoric, of course, is knowing when statements should be read 
as mere hyperbole--as in regular denunciations by one or another 
Supreme Court justice of a colleague's position as "without 
merit"--or as something else presumably far more serious, chal-
lenging either the professional competence or moral integrity of 
those who reject one's own proferred interpretations. 
I think that those of us interested in constitutional hermeneu-
tics can especially profit from asking what sorts of changes in our 
political system could, on the one hand, be authorized through ordi-
nary legislation and/or judicial interpretation (or, for that matter, 
activity by the executive branch in the absence of explicit statutory 
authorization) and what sorts, on the other hand, would require 
the inventiveness of "amendment." For example, could Congress 
simply authorize by legislation, or the Court otherwise legitimize 
through judicial decision, the election to office of a foreign-born 23-
10. See John Tagliabue, A Threat to Kohl, N.Y. Times AI, A8, col. I (April 23, 1991) 
(late edition). 
II. Though see Suber's discussion of "amendment by interpretation" in The Paradox of 
Self-Amendment at 197-206 (cited in note 6) and his comment that "[s)ince the New Deal era 
the fact of judicial amendment has become commonplace." ld. at 415 n.3. However, he adds 
that "the debate has shifted from its occurrence to its desireability and legitimacy," id., which 
suggests, among other things, that there is still more than a little resistance to the acceptance 
of this "commonplace" practice. 
12. Brest and Levinson, Constitutional Decisionmaking at II (cited in note 8). 
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year-old as President? Most analysts no doubt would believe this to 
be impossible, suggesting that this is a paradigm instance where 
"amendment" would be necessary and plausible "interpretation" 
unavailable. Even this may not be self-evident, as Professor 
D' Amato has recently argued, 13 although D' Amato's clever argu-
ment doesn't overcome the fact that most persons within the con-
temporary interpretive community would regard his argument, if 
presented within ordinary discourse, as "off-the-wall" and demon-
strative of an inability to understand the working conventions of 
our constitutional system (one of which is the important distinction 
between interpretation and amendment and the entailed position 
that not everything can be inferred from pre-existing legal 
materials). 
Though I am primarily interested in raising our consciousness 
about how we construct in our constitutional discourse the bounda-
ries between interpretation and amendment, I should note that the 
latter is a gross category that can be subjected itself to further re-
finement. Walter Murphy, for example, adopts an argument from 
West German (now presumably German) constitutional law that a 
true "amendment" does not "materially change" the pre-existing 
structure of government, but merely "supplement[s]" or otherwise 
perfects the structure.t4 Such a distinction rapidly takes us into the 
higher metatheoretical question of whether a purported constitu-
tional amendment could itself be unconstitutional as going beyond 
the implicit limitations on amendment generated by a correct un-
derstanding of the Constitution. Murphy's argument, albeit unu-
sual, is not original. 
As early as 1865, during congressional consideration of what 
became the thirteenth amendment, abolishing slavery, there was an 
attack on the constitutional propriety of any such amendment. 
Representative C.A. White, for example, presented "[t]he very term 
'amendment' [as] itself a word of limitation," disallowing a "ple-
nary, omnipotent, unlimited power over every subject of legisla-
tion."ts Representative White therefore attacked the proposed 
amendment for invading the entrenched powers of the state to con-
trol property and domestic institutions. Interestingly enough, Rep-
13. See Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The 'Easy Case' of the Under-
Aged President, 84 Nw. U.L. Rev. 250 (1989). 
14. See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
703, 754-57 (1980). See also Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 43 (Johns 
Hopkins U. Press, 1984) ("In our everyday discourse we distinguish amendments from fun-
damental changes because the word amendment ordinarily signifies incremental improve-
ments or corrections of a larger whole."). 
15. See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of the American Constitution 
282 (West Pub., 1990), as well as the other speeches collected at 278-289 canvassing the issue. 
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resentative Boutwell, a warm supporter of the amendment, agreed 
with the proposition that the amendment power was not unlimited. 
Thus he suggested that article V did not authorize amendments that 
would "establish slavery, or ... invite the King of Dahomey to rule 
over this country" insofar as they would contravene the purposes of 
the Constitution as laid out in the Preamble. 16 This controversy did 
not die with the Reconstruction debates. 
Thomas M. Cooley, certainly among the leading constitutional 
commentators of his generation, argued that a genuine amendment 
must "in the very nature of the case . . . be in harmony with the 
thing amended, so far at least as concerns its general spirit and pur-
pose. It must not be something so entirely incongruous that, in-
stead of amending or reforming it, it overthrows or revolutionizes 
it."I7 He wrote, therefore, that "[t]o convert a democratic republic 
into a government ruled by a privileged aristocracy or by a king, 
through an amendment of its constitution, is simply an impossibil-
ity. The change would not be an amendment but a revolution."Is 
Indeed, for Cooley 
any step in the direction of establishing a government which is 
entirely out of harmony with that which has been created under 
the constitution, or which is in the direction of taking the power 
of the state from the people and of substituting principles of gov-
ernment which were rejected when the constitution was estab-
lished, though it may be taken in the most formal and deliberate 
manner, and in precise conformity to the method of amendment 
established by the constitution, is inoperative in the very nature 
of things, unless it be taken expressly as a revolutionary proceed-
ing, to be accepted if need be, and upheld, by force. 19 
Baltimore attorney William Marbury made a similar argument 
in a 1919 Harvard Law Review article,2o where he distinguished 
16. ld. at 285-86. 
17. Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amendment the Federal Constitution, 2 Mich. 
L.J. 109, 118 (1893). See also Correspondence, id. at 334 for a letter by Cooley briefly reiter-
ating his argument. I owe these references to Professor Stephen Siegel, whose article, Loch-
ner Era Jurisprudence and The American Constitutional Tradition, when published, will be a 
major contribution to the understanding of American constitutional theory. See also 
Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. I 13, 119, 36 Pac. 424, 426 (1894): "(T]he term "amendment" 
implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an 
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed." 
18. Cooley, 2 Mich. L.J. at 118 (cited in note 17). 
19. ld. at 119 (emphasis added). 
20. William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 
223 (1919). The article is discussed in a very helpful article by John R. Vile, American Views 
of the Constitutional Amending Process: An Intellectual History of Article V, 35 Am. J. Leg. 
Hist. 44, 60-61 (1991). See also John R. Vile, The Amending Process: Alternative to Revolu-
tion, II Southeastern Pol. Rev. 49 (1983). 
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between the power to "amend" the Constitution and "the power to 
destroy it."21 Unlike Cooley's essay, Marbury's was directed at con-
crete legal controversies, particularly the eighteenth and nineteenth 
amendments, both of which he deemed illegitimate inasmuch as 
they fundamentally "destroy[ed] the states, by taking from them, 
directly, [some] of their legislative powers."22 
Most of the contemporary adherents of limitations on the 
amending power have been distinguished non-lawyer students of the 
Constitution, such as Murphy, Sotirios Barber, and Will Harris. It 
is thus worth mentioning that they have more recently been joined 
by well-established members of the legal academy. Yale Law 
School Professor Akhil Reed Amar, for example, distinguishes "be-
tween true constitutional amendments (changes within the pre-ex-
isting deep structure of the document) and constitutional 
repudiations (which may formally seem to fit Article V, but in fact 
reject the Constitution's essence of deliberative popular sover-
eignty)."23 And Yale student Jeff Rosen, responding to the recent 
controversy concerning the proposed Flag Burning Amendment, 
has argued that should it have been proposed by Congress and rati-
fied by the requisite number of states, it should nonetheless have 
been deemed unconstitutional by the judiciary inasmuch as it abro-
gates a right "retained by the people" and protected by the ninth 
amendment.24 
Nor are our difficulties over even if we concede that a particu-
lar change does not constitute a revolutionary transformation (and 
thus finesse the question whether it would be illegitimate if it were 
such a transformation). Some of the metatheoretical questions at 
the core of this discussion turned up to constitute the very core of a 
recent decision of the California Supreme Court, Raven v. 
Deukmejian.2s That case concerned the legitimacy of Proposition 
115, passed by popular referendum, which required multiple 
amendment of California's criminal code in both its substantive and 
procedural aspects. Several challenges were mounted against the 
Proposition, the most important, for our purposes, being one predi-
cated on Article 18 of the California Constitution. That provision 
allows California's "electors" to "amend the Constitution by initia-
21. Marbury, 33 Harv. L. Rev. at 225 (emphasis in original) (cited in note 20). 
22. ld. at 228. 
23. Akhil R. Amar, The Amendment Process (Outside Anicle V), Supplement to the 
Encyclopedia of the American Constitution (forthcoming). 
24. See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional? 100 Yale L.J. 
1073 (1991). See especially pp. 1084-1089 for a discussion of"Natural Rights Limitations on 
the Amendment Power" and references to some of the recent literature concerning the scope 
of the amendment power under article V. 
25. 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal.), 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990). 
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tive," but it goes on to require that a "revision" of the Constitution 
first be proposed either by a constitutional convention or by the leg-
islature, followed by popular ratification. An "amendment" is pre-
sumably only a relatively marginal change, in contrast to f&r more 
substantially transformative "revisions." The Court pronounced 
one section of the Proposition just such a "revision," so that it was 
therefore unconstitutional given its origin simply in a popular refer-
endum. It was precisely an example of the "comprehensive 
changes" requiring "more formality, discussion and deliberation 
than is available through the initiative process."26 
So we now have, at the very least, the following spectrum of 
possibilities in regard to describing any given legal development X: 
(1) It is, especially if the result of a judicial decision, simply a recog-
nition, called "interpretation," of what was already immanent 
within the existing body of legal materials; (2) It is, especially if a 
statute passed by a legislature, a change not disallowed by the con-
straints established by the Constitution and thus what might be 
termed an allowable "interpretation" of the powers allowed legisla-
tures by the Constitution; (3) It represents a genuine change not 
immanent within the pre-existing materials or allowable simply by 
the use of the powers granted (or tolerated) by the Constitution, 
although the change, being fairly marginal, allows one to speak of it 
unproblematically as an "amendment"; (4) It represents a genuine 
change of such dimension as to be described as a "revision"-i.e., a 
special kind of amendment-but that change, nonetheless, is con-
gruent with the the immanent values of the constitutional order. 
Still, given its dimensions, it might require some special procedures 
to give it validity, such as those set out by the very text of the Cali-
fornia Constitution or, perhaps, in what can be validly inferred 
from the existence of multiple paths to constitutional amendment 
set out in Article V of the United States Constitution;27 (5) It repre-
sents a change of such fundamental dimension as to be called truly 
revolutionary and thus taken out of the language of amendment at 
all. 
All of these distinctions merit more discussion, but what fol-
lows will concentrate only on the first three, the clarification of 
what is immanent that we call "interpretation" and the addition to 
what is immanent through amendatory change. Presumably one 
must accept at least the plausibility of that distinction in order to 
proceed further into the intellectual thickets set out above. 
26. 52 Cal. 3d at 342. 
27. See William Harris, The Interpretable Constitution ch. 4 (forthcoming). 
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II 
Having already introduced, through James Madison, the issue 
of the United States Bank, let me tum to John Marshall's opinion 
upholding the Bank in McCulloch v. Maryland,2s justifiably re-
garded as perhaps the most majestic single opinion of the Supreme 
Court in our two-century history. Technically, of course, it con-
cerned only the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United 
States, given that the First Bank had expired in 1811. But I think it 
fair to say that McCulloch also serves as an advisory opinion that 
the First Bank was perfectly constitutional as well, thus joining the 
First Congress in rejecting Madison's advice that it was not. Just as 
important, of course, is the host of congressional legislation that 
could be now passed under the broad reading of national powers 
articulated by Marshall, who took the occasion to spell out an over-
arching theory of national power that can be read as assigning basi-
cally plenary authority to Congress. I will not rehearse all of what 
is surely familiar to most of you, including the functional elimina-
tion of the tenth amendment and the necessary and proper clause as 
meaningful limits OJ. the federal government. I cannot resist, 
though, quoting one of the single most famous sentences of the 
opinion, where Marshall emphasizes that he is expounding "a con-
stitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to 
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."29 Interestingly 
enough, the word Marshall emphasizes is "crises." I prefer, on the 
other hand, to put a bit more stress on the word "adapted." 
The theory, even if not the particular result, of McCulloch con-
cerned, indeed appalled, many eminent Americans of the time. For 
my purposes, among the most interesting reactions was that of 
Madison himself. Although Madison, sometimes denominated "the 
father of the Constitution," acquiesced in the constitutional legiti-
macy at least of the bill establishing the Second Bank of the United 
States, which he had signed as President, he had never formally 
repudiated his opposition, on constitutional grounds, to the First 
Bank, and he was clearly disturbed by the breadth of Marshall's 
opinion. Writing the great Virginia Justice Spencer Roane follow-
ing McCulloch, Madison wondered what might have happened 
some three decades earlier had the supporters of the new Constitu-
tion frankly articulated "a rule of construction . . . as broad and 
pliant as what has occurred." He could not "easily be persuaded 
that the avowal of such a rule [at the state ratifying conventions] 
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
29. 17 U.S. at 415. 
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would not have prevented its ratification. "Jo 
Consider in this context, then, a comment by Professor James 
Boyd White, who somewhat laconically writes that Marshall's opin-
ion in McCulloch "seems to be less an interpretation of the Consti-
tution than an amendment to it, the overruling of which is 
unimaginable."Jl The "amendment" presumably involves not the 
legality of the Bank per se, for there are a number of routes by 
which that could have been upheld,32 but rather the doctrine by 
which Marshall justified it, which operated to give Congress (and 
the national government) much more power than a more limited 
reading of the Constitution would have. 
I think it is important that Professor White, who is unusually 
careful in his use of language, does not appear to be leveling a criti-
cism against either the opinion or Marshall, even as he offers a kind 
of support to Madison's skepticism about the provenance of Mar-
shall's opinion. White comes truly to praise Marshall rather than to 
criticize him. But if White captures our common understanding-
i.e., if we share both his perception of McCulloch as a de facto 
amendment and his willingness to commend Marshall's perform-
ance in McCulloch-then we need, I believe, to integrate that un-
derstanding into the contemporary debate about constitutional 
interpretation. This debate in substantial measure concerns the lim-
its on the authority of constitutional interpreters, whether judges or 
others. It was Marshall, of course, who in Marbury v. Madison had 
defined the importance of a written constitution-the "greatest im-
provement on political institutions" put forth by the new American 
nation-as consisting in the specification of powers (and limits) of 
the government.33 The problem, of course, is how we decide dis-
putes about what the "writing" actually means. Is McCulloch an 
example of remembrance or forgetting? And does Marshall exhibit 
30. Letter of September 2, 1819, in Max Farrand, ed., 3 Records of the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787, 435 (Yale U. Press, 1911). 
31. James White, When Words Lose Their Meaning 263 (U. Chi. Press, 1984). Profes-
sor White is certainly not the first person to view Marshall as something other than the mere 
applier, through interpretation, of constitutional commands. Thus Peter Suber quotes from 
an 1890 report of the New York State Bar Association that states, "It is almost incorrect to 
say that throughout this period [1804-65] the Constitution was unamended, for it was so 
expanded by the decisions of Marshall that they amounted to virtual amendments to its text. •• 
Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment 199 (Peter Lang Pub., 1990). 
32. Marshall could have, for example, stated that the "necessary and proper clause" 
required a detemtination by Congress that the Bank was extremely important (and not 
merely convenient) and that Congress had done so, or he might have engaged in an independ-
ent determination of the "compelling interest" (to use a thoroughly anachronistic term) be-
hind the Bank and found that there was indeed such a compelling interest. The fundamental 
importance of McCulloch, of course, is that he did neither. 
33. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
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a mastery of judicial craft or a much more ominous (to some) Nie-
tzschean (or Humpty-Dumptyish) mastery of text and language?34 
In any case, we must decide on our own appellation for Mar-
shall's exercise in constitutional argument in McCulloch. Mar-
shall's own word to describe McCulloch is "adaptation"; White's is 
"amendment"; Jefferson, always more plain-spoken, might well 
have used the word "usurpation,"3s given his description in 1820 of 
the judiciary as a "subtle core of sappers and miners constantly 
working under ground to undermine the foundations of our confed-
erated fabric. "36 
The problem posed by Marshall and McCulloch is, of course, 
repeated in many other cases. Consider, as only one example, our 
treatment of the constitutional text stating that "No State shall ... 
pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." Most 
contemporary analysts "know" (and teach) that the "proper" read-
ing of this patch of text is that states shall not pass laws unreasona-
bly impairing the obligation of contracts. Recall the important 
opinion by Chief Justice Hughes in the Blaisdell case37 that cru-
cially interpreted the Contract Clause to mean less than the categor-
ical prohibition the "naive" reader might have thought it required. 
Though Hughes' opinion is suffused with reference to the "emer-
gency" facing the nation, he blandly insisted that "[e]mergency does 
not create power" but provides only the "conditions" for exercising 
otherwise legitimate power. That is, no "amendment" was neces-
sary in order for the Minnesota legislature to meet the threat to 
economic stability posed by the Great Depression; ordinary inter-
pretation sufficed to supply the power. But it is obvious that one 
could describe the result in Blaisdell (and its justification by 
Hughes) in the terms White applied to Marshall's opinion in 
McCulloch. 
34. Even Robert Bork is hesitant to condemn Marshall. In his book The Tempting of 
America: The Political Seduction of the Law, Bork labels Marshall "an activist judge," but 
asserts that "his activism consisted mainly in distorting statutes in order to create occasions 
for constitutional rulings that preserved the structure of the United States. Although he may 
have deliberately misread the statutes, he did not misread the Constitution. His constitu-
tional rulings, often argued brilliantly, are faithful to the document." Robert H. Bork, The 
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 21 (Free Press, 1990). Bork would 
presumably vigorously disagree with White's analysis of McCulloch, not to mention 
Madison's criticisms as expressed to Spencer Roane. It is obvious, of couse, that this raises 
significant problems for anyone who is, like Bork, committed to so-called "original intent'" as 
the authoritative guide to constitutional meaning, for one can hardly resist asking why Mar-
shall is a more authoritative guide to constitutional meaning than "Pops" Madison. 
35. See Letter to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in Merrill D. Peterson, The Ponable 
Thomas Jefferson 562 (Viking Press, 1975). 
36. Letter to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 1820), in Dumas Malone, 6 Jefferson and His 
Time 356 (Little, Brown, 1981). 
37. Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
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There is nothing "special" about a case like Blaisdell, save for 
its particular dramatic import within the context of the New Deal. 
The identical problem, of course, is posed by any first amendment 
case that ends up in fact allowing an infringement of speech. But it 
is well known that not even ardent members of the ACLU believe 
that false proxy statements or perjurious testimony should in fact be 
protected against federal sanctions, and few believe that "amend-
ment" of the first amendment is a prerequisite to regulation. 
Can we hope to achieve a principled (and is this the same thing 
as saying "disinterested" or "non-political"?) resolution of the dis-
pute about how we should describe cases like Blaisdell or its first 
amendment equivalents? Are there formal criteria, teachable by 
constitutional adepts, that can be learned by students of the Consti-
tution, that will allow us to agree, as a presumed "factual" matter, 
on what constitute interpretations and amendments? (We could 
still disagree, of course, on the "value" attached to any particular 
prof erred example.) If one answers, with me, that the answer is no, 
what might that tell us about our overarching topic-the implica-
tions for constitutional theory of grappling with the issue of consti-
tutional amendment? 
III 
I thus (finally) arrive at an explanation of the title of this article 
and its request that the reader supply the number of amendments to 
the United States Constitution. If White is correct and the doctrine 
enunciated-dare one say the constitutional reality brought into be-
ing?-by McCulloch is "in fact" an amendment to the Constitution, 
then it would seem to follow that the answer to my multiple choice 
question cannot be "(b) 26," however common that answer might 
be.Js In my multiple choice test, "26" refers simply-and, I want to 
argue, merely-to the number of explicit textual additions to the 
1787 document. Even this way of putting it is not without its ambi-
guities, given the multiple thrusts of several of the amendments. 
There is, for example, no theoretical reason for the inclusion in the 
fifth amendment of the right to a grand jury before indictment to-
gether with the right to compensation for a taking,39 nor would it 
have violated any sense of organic integrity to join what we call the 
38. Or, more precisely, it might be said that the answer could be 26 only if by some 
sheer coincidence that turned out to be the final number after applying a sophisticated theory 
of constitutional amendment. 
39. As Akhil Reed Amar has recently suggested, there may be a good political reason, 
i.e., the "bundling" of the compensation clause, which apparently only James Madison 
thought particularly important, with other provisions much more popular. See Akhil R. 
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1181 (1991). 
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fourth and sixth amendment, together with the grand jury and self-
incrimination portions of the fifth, into a single amendment dealing 
with criminal procedure. Nor would it have been jarring for the 
fourteenth amendment to have been broken down into several sepa-
rately numbered amendments. 
What I want to argue (perhaps "assert" is the more accurate 
term) is that it is almost literally thoughtless to believe that the best 
answer to my conundrum is "26" at least if one means to be asking 
a theoretically interesting question. The only question to which one 
can be confident that that can be the best answer is "how many 
explicitly numbered textual additions to the Constitution have oc-
curred since 1787?" Perhaps it is a part of what E. D. Hirsch might 
call "cultural literacy" to know that the answer to that is "26," but 
I will be so bold as to say that that answer, without more, demon-
strates a theoretical illiteracy that is far more alarming than would 
be the failure to remember, say, that we have a twenty-fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution. Knowing that there have been twenty-six 
explicit numbered textual additions to the Constitution demon-
strates no more understanding of the American government than 
the knowledge of how many vice-presidents we have had (knowl-
edge that I will freely confess I do not now possess). Central to 
understanding the American government-whether as lawyer or 
political scientist-is recognition, and concomitant assimilation, of 
the extent to which the Constitution has indeed been amended, been 
the subject of political inventiveness, by means other than the addi-
tion of explicit text. 40 
You could certainly be excused if you believed, on the basis of 
my harsh criticism of "26" as the answer, that the answer at least 
cannot be "(a) [fewer than] 26." This would seem to follow from 
the proposition that there have been at least the 26 specifically num-
bered inventions plus at least one more (e.g., Marshall's opinion in 
McCulloch, which would, of course, suggest that the best answer is 
"(c) [more than] 26"). Alas, I don't think we can so readily reject 
"(a)" as a candidate for the best answer. How can this be, given the 
existence of 26 numbered textual additions? The answer lies in de-
termining if all of these numbered textual additions genuinely dif-
fered from what was already immanent in the pre-existing 
understandings or if at least some of them merely "declared" or 
"recognized" what was already there for anyone with a gift of inter-
pretive insight to grasp. Unless the numbered textual addition is 
40. This is obviously the crux of Bruce Ackerman's extraordinary work, though, as 
shall be indicated below, I believe that he has failed to confront the importance of the inter-
pretation-amendment distinction for his own enterprise. 
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thought by a competent lawyer to change the pre-existing legal real-
ity, then I am hesitant to deem it an "amendment" in any theoreti-
cally interesting sense. 
Surely the very existence of the numbered textual additions is 
presumptive evidence that they were thought to be required and 
interpretation unavailing? Well, yes and no. Perhaps they are evi-
dence that someone at the time of their adoption thought they were 
required, though an entirely separate question is whether we think 
they were required. But it is not even clear that supporters of sev-
eral of the textual additions believed that the additions genuinely 
changed the meaning of the Constitution as correctly understood. 
This issue of the "necessity" of amendment was present at the 
very beginning of the Constitution. After all, the principal impedi-
ment to ratification was the failure of the Convention to include a 
bill of rights. The supporters of the Constitution insisted that no 
such bill was necessary, for the national constitution, unlike its state 
counterparts, was adopted under a theory of "assigned powers." 
That is, the national government was not plenary, lacking only that 
power specifically excluded by the foundation document. Instead, it 
had only those powers specifically granted by the constitutional 
text. Alexander Hamilton made this the crux of his argument in 
the 84th Federalist: How could anyone seriously believe that Con-
gress could have the power to regulate the press, given that it was 
nowhere assigned any such power? "[T]he constitution ought not 
to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the abuse of 
an authority, which was not given."4t James Wilson, who played a 
far more important role than Hamilton at the Philadelphia conven-
tion and became one of the first members of the United States 
Supreme Court, had made a similar argument to the citizens of 
Philadelphia in regard to demands for the addition of a specific pro-
tection of freedom of the press: "The proposed system possesses no 
influence whatever upon the press; and it would be been merely nu-
gatory, to have introduced a formal declaration upon the subject."42 
Indeed, to call it "nugatory" might be to compliment the first 
amendment. James Iredell pronounced it "not only useless, but 
dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights which are not intended 
to be given up; because it would be implying, in the strongest man-
ner, that every right not included in the exception might be im-
paired by the government without usurpation."43 From this 
41. Federalist 84 (Hamilton) in Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist Papers 575 (Wes-
leyan U. Press, 1961). 
42. James Wilson, An Address to a Meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia (1787), 
quoted in Lucas A. Powe, The Founh Estate and the Constitution 44 (U. Cal. Press, 1991). 
43. Speech of July 29, 1788, before the North Carolina ratifying convention, quoted in 
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perspective, the first amendment does indeed drastically change the 
constitutional understanding, though not by prohibiting Congress 
from regulating speech or the press; rather, it is by implicitly adding 
to Congress's powers the ability to regulate everything that is not 
specifically named in the Bill of Rights.44 
If one accepts the more moderate version of the Hamilton-Wil-
son argument, 4S though, then the first amendment is rendered 
wholly "unnecessary"; proper interpretation would preclude consci-
entious members of Congress from passing, the President from sign-
ing, or the judiciary from enforcing, a bill abridging speech, 
establishing a national church, or whatever, inasmuch as such 
power was not specifically assigned the Congress in Article I. It 
may be jarring to suggest that the first amendment contributes 
nothing, strictly speaking, to the Constitution.46 That may be evi-
dence, however, only of the distance we have traveled from the orig-
inal understanding of the Constitution as creating only a limited 
government of assigned powers. In any event, there is no reason to 
believe that even all of the representatives who voted for the first 
amendment did so in the belief that it was "required" in order to 
preserve the liberties enunciated. They just as likely may have be-
lieved that it was required as a political gesture to anti-Federalists 
who might, if not appeased, use the very procedures of Article V to 
bring into being a new constitutional convention that would recon-
sider the Philadelphia handiwork ostensibly ratified by the state 
Farber & Sherry, A History of the American Constitution at 224 (cited in note 15) (emphasis 
added). 
44. Indeed, the ninth amendment was added specifically to forestall such an interpreta-
tion. See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 
1162-64 (1987). 
45. One problem with this analysis, of course, was the existence of Article I, Section 9, 
which specifically prevents the Congress from, among other things, passing bills of attainder 
or creating titles of nobility. Indeed, Hamilton specifically emphasizes the importance of 
Section 9 as providing basic protection; he does not, however, address the point that if Sec-
tion 9 is in fact "necessary" in order to prevent such legislation, then the Wilson-Hamilton 
argument fails. Many opponents of the Constitution were not so restrained and gleefully 
pointed out the tension between Section 9 and the argument that the Constitution should be 
construed only as a grant of explicitly assigned powers. 
46. Fred Schauer has suggested to me that perhaps the real importance of the first 
amendment is its incorporation into the fourteenth amendment as a limitation on the states. 
If one predicate of eighteenth century constitutional theory was the limitation of the national 
government only to its assigned powers, another was the basically plenary powers of the 
states, which indeed made it crucial to establish bills of rights in state con~titutions against 
the power of the otherwise unconstrained state. Without the textual presence of the first 
amendment, it would have been much harder to impose its norms on states. Perhaps, but 
surely one could have reached many of the same results either through interpretation of the 
"privileges of immunities" clause of the fourteenth amendment or the "republican form of 
government" clause in Article IV. It is undeniable that the existence of the first amendment 
provided a powerful rhetorical resource, but this is quite dift'erent from arguing that it was 
"necessary" to attaining the ends sought. 
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conventions. 47 
It may be a nice thing to have a clear specification of the inabil-
ity of Congress to regulate the press or establish a religion, but that 
is a stylistic more than a legal insight, for nothing would be lost, 
according to the Hamiltonian argument, by the absence of the 
amendment. From this perspective, as a matter of law the amend-
ment may be little more than a "guide to the dimwitted" who need 
the aid of textual specification, even though the rest of us would 
arrive at precisely the same destination through the use of accepta-
ble techniques of constitutional interpretation. There is one other, 
somewhat more generous, explanation available, though it scarcely 
emphasizes the "necessity" of the amendment. Amar has noted the 
importance that James Madison placed on the inclusion of "funda-
mental maxims of free government" within the constitutional text 
itself as a means of popular education.4s Hamilton rather acerbi-
cally dismissed such didactic "aphorisms which make the principal 
figure in several of our State bills of rights"; he deemed them more 
suited to "a treatise of ethics than ... a constitution of govern-
ment."49 Perhaps one finds Madison more plausible than Hamil-
ton, and this would make the addition of the first amendment to the 
Constitution of some genuine political significance in terms of the 
socialization of the citizenry. But the rigorous lawyer would pre-
sumably find this of relatively little importance when trying to de-
cide its legal significance. 
One may resist the view that the first amendment adds nothing 
of legal importance to the Constitution. But surely it is difficult to 
disagree with Madison's own concession that the tenth amendment 
"may be considered as superfluous. "so Indeed, Amar notes that 
"the congressional resolution accompanying the Bill [of Rights] ex-
plicitly described it as containing 'declaratory' as well as 'restrictive' 
provisions."si Consider in this context the careful statement by 
then-Justice Rehnquist that "an express declaration" of federalistic 
limits on Congressional power "is found in the Tenth Amend-
47. See Professor Paul Finkelman's important article, James Madison and the Bill of 
Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 301, 328-47, which offers just such a 
"political" interpretation of Madison's support for the Bill of Rights and rejects the oft-ar-
gued view that Jefferson had persuaded Madison that such amendments were desirable on the 
merits. 
48. See Amar, 100 Yale L.J. at 1208-09 (cited in note 39). The quoted phrase comes 
from an October 17, 1788 letter of Madison to Thomas Jefferson. 
49. ld. at 1208 n.344, quoting Federalist 84. 
50. ld. at 1154 n.l09, quoting Madison's speech to the House of Representatives of 
June 8, 1789. 
51. ld. at 1154 n.109, quoting 2 Documentary History of the Constitution 321 (Dept. 
State, 1894). 
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ment"52 rather than, say, "granted" or "established" by that 
amendment. 
Imagine, then, asking supporters of a textual addition to indi-
cate precisely why they thought it was required. It is far different to 
say, on the one hand, "because the Constitution cannot legitimately 
be interpreted to allow X, and the new text will authorize X" or, on 
the other, "because even though the Constitution, correctly inter-
preted, already contains X within it, we nonetheless should add a 
patch of text either to control the stupid or politically malevolent 
judge or to educate the citizenry who look to the Constitution for 
memorizable maxims of government." I presume, for example, that 
many more supporters of the ERA believed that it was "required" 
for one of these second reasons than for the first. (Among other 
things, incidentally, this model, if accurate, speaks to the priority 
that even sophisticates might give to "textualism" as what my col-
league Philip Bobbitt calls a "modality" of interpretation. Other 
techniques seem so fancy, while reference to a text seems to elimi-
nate any problems.) 
One cannot say, then, with any particular confidence that all of 
the textual additions were thought even by their supporters at the 
time to be legally necessary. But the problem becomes even more 
complex when we address certain textual additions from our own 
contemporary perspectives as well-trained lawyers. Take, for exam-
ple, the thirteenth amendment, abolishing slavery. Surely those 
who believed, with Frederick Douglass, that the Constitution never 
allowed slavery in the first place, could scarcely have believed that 
an amendment was necessary to abolish it.s3 Still, Douglass un-
doubtedly represented a minority position, and most partisans of 
the thirteenth amendment, including Abraham Lincoln, believed 
that it was legally necessary. But we in 1991 certainly need not 
believe, as a legal proposition, that the thirteenth amendment is 
"necessary" in order to abolish slavery. To hold such a view would 
require rejection of the propriety of practically every important 
commerce clause decision since 1937. Can it conceivably be the 
case, for example, that a Congress authorized to tell the Darby 
Lumber Company that it must pay a minimum wage to its laborers 
is without the power to transform chattel slavery? If we accept the 
legitimacy of decisions like Darby, NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks 
Clothing Co. (the fascinating companion case to the more famous 
52. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (emphasis added). 
53. For Douglass's argument (which was not original with him), see The Constitution of 
the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery? in Philip Foner, ed., 2 The Life and 
Writings of Frederick Douglass 467-80 (International Pub., 1950), discussed in Sanford Levin-
son, Constitutional Faith 31, 76-77 (Princeton U. Press, 1988). 
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Jones & Laughlin decision), and Wickard v. Filbum, then we simply 
cannot believe that the thirteenth amendment is of much more than 
symbolic importance.s4 (I do not berate symbolism: that was a 
good enough reason to support the Equal Rights Amendment, but 
there is an obvious difference between praising either the thirteenth 
amendment or the ERA as a symbolic artifact and asserting that it 
was "necessary" to transform legal possibility.) 
I am even more confident that few contemporary analysts-
about the same number who believe that a constitutional amend-
ment was necessary in order to disallow school segregation-believe 
that the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments are "necessary," 
given contemporary intepretations of the fourteenth amendment in 
regard to racial and gender classification concerning fundamental 
rights. And, if the Supreme Court was correct in Harper v. Virginia 
Board of Elections,ss which found Virginia's poll tax for state elec-
tions to violate the Constitution, then surely the twenty-fourth 
amendment, which two years before barred a poll tax in federal 
elections, is wholly unnecessary. Only if one agrees with Justice 
Harlan's considerably less generous reading of the fourteenth 
amendment would it be the case that we would lose something le-
gally significant were the fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fourth 
amendments suddenly to disappear from the text of the Constitu-
tion. Indeed, ironically (but fittingly) enough, there were some sup-
porters of the fourteenth amendment who nonetheless argued that it 
was not at all necessary because it simply spelled out what a correct 
interpretation of the Constitution already required.s6 Let me 
quickly concede that an accurate historical portrayal of the back-
54. Both Fred Schauer and Akhil Reed Amar have reminded me that I am overlooking 
one important legal consequence of the thirteenth amendment, at least given the argument in 
the text concerning the power of Congress to abolish slavery under the (modern reading of 
the) commerce clause: The thirteenth amendment entrenches that abolition of slavery; thus, 
Congress loses the option it has under the commerce clause of acquiescing to the use of slave 
labor in the states. Ordinary legislation, by definition, can be overridden by a subsequent 
legislature. Thus the thirteenth amendment is not a genuine parallel to the Equal Right 
Amendment unless one adopts Douglass's view that the unamended Constitution, correctly 
read, was as hostile to slavery as the unamended Constitution, correctly read, is supportive of 
gender equality. 
55. 383 u.s. 663 (1966). 
56. See Howard Jay Graham, Our "Declaratory" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L. 
Rev. 3 (1954). Graham begins his article by noting that "[a] 'declaratory constitutional 
amendment' is today almost as baffiing and incongruous a concept as an 'unconstitutional 
constitution.'" For contemporary readers, "[t]o amend [the Constitution] is to revise it and 
change it, not to discover or 'declare' an antecedent meaning, much less to define or redefine 
some pre-existent natural right or rights.'' He immediately argues, however, that "it often 
was squarely otherwise with our ancestors" and that we must recapture that understanding, 
however alien to current sensibility, if we are to understand the theory underlying the four-
teenth amendment on the part of at least some of its most important supporters. (I am grate-
ful to Akhil Amar for reminding me of Graham's article.) For a more recent statement of the 
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ground of all of those amendments would take into account the per-
ception of some of the best constitutional analysts of the day that 
they were indeed "necessary." But this is only to highlight one of 
the central mysteries of the doctrinal operation of what I call "con-
stitutional faith": the process by which "best constitutional analy-
sis" is subtly transformed by the passage of time so that a given 
legal doctrine, say the power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause, becomes radically transformed without formal amendment 
ever being deemed necessary. 
Someone who disagrees with Professor White's designation of 
McCulloch as an amendment-and disagrees as well with the de-
scription of any other decision as a de facto amendment-might 
well have an interpretive theory sufficiently generous to view many 
of the explicit textual additions as unnecessary and spelling out 
what was already "in" the Constitution to be teased out through 
legitimate interpretation. Once that move is taken, then "(a) [fewer 
than] 26" is clearly the best answer, certainly more sophisticated 
theoretically than "(b) 26." Indeed, the central premise of my argu-
ment is that practically any answer is more sophisticated theoreti-
cally than "(b)." 
IV 
I want to be clear in what I am arguing (and what I am not 
arguing). I have proferred a distinction-an opposition-between 
interpretation and amendment even as I have indicated my belief 
that I cannot provide formal criteria by which to distinguish the 
two. Furthermore, I strongly suspect that clever analysts can re-
peatedly show that what are thought to be "interpretations" are 
"amendments" and, of course, just the opposite, that what were 
thought to be great constitutional inventions--such as woman's suf-
frage-were "in fact" not necessary at all because they were already 
immanent in the existing constitutional regime. Thus it may be that 
the opposition I am suggesting is what my colleague Jack Balkin 
has recently termed a "nested opposition,"s7 by which he refers to 
basic notions that structure our thought even as they are constantly 
subject to conceptual revision and "deconstructive" analysis. The 
philosophy from which such an approach is drawn is what has 
come to be called non-foundational pragmatism. That is, regardless 
of our inability to provide an allegedly firm, and formalistic, con-
ceptual grounding of our terms, we nonetheless find that we make 
"declaratory" thesis, see Michael Kent Curtis, No State Shall Abridge: The Founeenth 
Amendment and the Bill of Rights 90-91 (Duke U. Press, 1986). 
57. J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99 Yale L.J. 1669 (1990). 
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our way through the world-or, more accurately, through the 
forms of life that comprise our worlds-by recurrence to basic no-
tions that we simply seem unable to leave behind. 
Balkin suggests that the public-private distinction is one such 
nested opposition. Even as the latest analyst proves once more that 
the distinction is, according to some abstract scheme, untenable, he 
or she will almost inevitably reinvent it, as even more untenable 
(and truly unthinkable) is a world that indeed collapses the two no-
tions into one undifferentiated concept. So, I suggest, is it the case 
with the distinction between interpretation and invention-amend-
ment. As Stanley Fish would be the first to point out, each of us at 
every moment is quite able to construct-and even believe in-such 
a distinction so far as our own analyses are concerned. Certainly 
one cannot make the slightest sense of Bruce Ackerman's enter-
prise, which I believe to be the most important and imaginative 
work now being done in the area of constitutional theory, without 
accepting the distinction.ss I do not know if Ackerman accepts 
White's description of McCulloch as an amendment (signifying a 
"constitutional moment," in Ackerman's language). But he must 
surely believe this to be the case of cases like West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish and the previously mentioned Darby Lumber Co., even if he 
would correctly argue that the decisions must be placed within the 
context of a supple and complex process of amendment of which 
they were simply the final step. Ackerman rejects in toto the earlier 
New Deal historiography by which the decisions of 1937 were sim-
ply restorations of the initial (and presumptively legitimate) Mar-
shallian vision as spelled out in McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden.s9 
Were they merely restorations, then there would be no need for him 
to construct his marvelously complex account of Publian politics 
and constitutional moments that provide an alternative rendering of 
the American political process. 
The most significant alternative, from the perspective of the 
traditional lawyer, concerns the relative displacement of Article V 
as the mechanism by which amendments occur. Not only have 
Americans been inventive in their use of Article V; more significant, 
their inventiveness has been manifested in the very process of inven-
tion itself. Just as the "scientific method" itself has been trans-
formed in the process of conducting the operations of "science" 
itself, so has the method of constitutional governance been trans-
58. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale 
L.J. 1013 (1984); Bruce A. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 Yale 
L.J. 453 (1989). 
59. For a discussion of this point see Sanford Levinson, Review, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1429, 
1449-50 (1989). 
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formed in the process of actually governing ourselves over the past 
two centuries. It is our ignorance about the methods and proce-
dures that we have actually used to provide the framework of con-
stitutional governance that so disturbs Ackerman and drives his 
project. Our ignorance is not merely an academic affront; accord-
ing to Ackerman, it leads to a fundamentally stunted view of polit-
ical possibility and of our own capacities as potentially Publian 
citizens who can engage not only in constitutional "interpretation," 
but, more importantly, constitutional fabrication. 
v 
I conclude with two comments. The first is that Ackerman has 
made not the slightest effort to delineate the method by which he 
recognizes something as an "amendment" rather than a legitimate 
"interpretation." He can hardly believe that we know it when we 
see it; his own historiography of the New Deal, as already sug-
gested, contradicts the conventional restorationist understanding of 
the period. I obviously think that it would be unfair to expect Ack-
erman to present a fully worked out, formalizable theory that could 
be applied transhistorically and transculturally. But is it equally 
unfair to expect him to say more than he has? Does not a theory so 
dependent as his on the perceived difference between interpretation 
and amendment require an acknowledgment of the interpretive di-
lemmas just outlined in this particular paper? After all, unless one 
believes that the New Deal cases do signify amendments, there is 
literally no need for the complex apparatus of Ackerman's 
argument. 
This first comment is directed at those interested in constitu-
tional theory per se and, perhaps most particularly, at Bruce Acker-
man himself. But my second comment is directed more at a 
broader audience, including, at the very least, political scientists 
and historians. One reason I am so fascinated by Ackerman's pro-
ject is the sweep of his reconceptualization of American politics and 
the way it "really works." It is not irrelevant that Ackerman has a 
joint appointment in the Yale political science department, not 
heretofore known for its commitment to normative political theory 
per se. His central project is to establish the existence within the 
operative paradigms of American politics an alternative to Article 
V as a process of amendment. This alternative process involves a 
complex mixture of behaviors and perceptions by President, Con-
gress, and the electorate. To examine adequately the plausibility of 
Ackerman's account requires immersion in the literatures, among 
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others, of presidential leadership, public opinion, and the operation 
of the electoral process. 
There may still be some political scientists who would respond 
that the purported distinction between interpretation and amend-
ment is of no interest to them, that it can be freely ignored by those 
interested in the hard-stuff of political behavior. Most of us, 
though, by now have been persuaded that this is an implausible ac-
count of the doing of political science, that one can scarcely ignore a 
culture's own self-understanding if one wishes to understand its be-
havior. Indeed, the very notion of behavior, we have been taught by 
Clifford Geertz and many others, can hardly be separated from the 
interpretive understandings attached to winks, raised hands, and 
other physical actions presumably the focus of our attentions. But 
one need not resolve this theoretical debate in order to believe that 
the distinction between amendment and interpretation is of import 
even to the most tough-minded political scientists. I would be as-
tonished, for example, if the standard textbooks purporting to intro-
duce "American government" to students did not, at some point, 
make implicit recourse to the distinction by way of teaching the 
young how amendments are added to the Constitution. To the ex-
tent that such discussions focus exclusively on Article V they are, to 
put it bluntly, wrong. But to expand the discussion beyond Article 
V demands some kind of structured analysis that rapidly leads into 
just the kinds of distinctions suggested in this paper. Or at least this 
is my own central thesis. 
I hope that I have demonstrated the genuine problems, well 
worth the investment of our intellectual energies, packed into the 
conundrum that provides the title for my paper. More particularly, 
I hope I have demonstrated why "(b) 26" is intellectually bankrupt 
as the correct answer, though it is defensible as an answer, so long 
as one concedes the potential legitimacy of at least one other answer 
and, perhaps, both (which would justify "(d) all of the above" as the 
best answer). But, most importantly, I hope to have demonstrated 
as well why I believe that there is no work going on within the legal 
academy that so truly leads us into the depths of constitutional in-
quiry and invites, for their illumination, the interdisciplinary meet-
ing of departments across the entire university community. 
